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Laval théologique et philosophique, 45, 2 (juin 1989) 
"EXPRESSION" AND "EXPRESSIVE" 
IN RELIGIOUS TALK FOR THE ARTS 
John KING-FARLOW 
RESUME. — Les écoles profanes d'expressionnistes et de formalistes en esthétique se 
voient comparées à deux voies religieuses différentes pour voir Dieu, la beauté et 
la créativité. La première voie inclut une perspective temporelle : le temps 
intervient entre la conception et l'intention à la création de ce qui va exister en 
Dieu ou Son monde. La seconde, sans perspective temporelle, concerne davantage 
la diffusion atemporelle d'une propriété hautement abstraite, la beauté, dans la 
connaissance de Dieu. — Tormey et Shiner, dans deux des attaques séculières les 
mieux connues sur l'expressionnisme, sont présentés comme dépendant de 
formes d'un naturalisme à la recherche d'arguments. Les manières religieuses 
d'interpréter des termes comme "expressif", "expression"et "miracle"peuvent 
être libérantes pour des philosophes de différentes sortes. 
SUMMARY. — Secular Schools of Expressionists and Formalists in aesthetics are 
compared to two religious ways of viewing God, Beauty and Creativity. The first 
religious way involves a temporal perspective : time moves from conception and 
intention to the creation of what will exist in God or His world. The second, 
timeless perspective concerns more the atemporal spread of a highly abstract 
property, Beauty, in God's Knowledge. — Tormey and Shiner, in two of the best 
known secular attacks on Expressionism, are shown to depend on question-
begging forms of Naturalism for arguments. Religious ways of interpreting terms 
like "expressive", "expression" and "miracle" can be liberating for philosophers 
of very varied kinds. 
I N THE FIRST two parts of this essay I shall be concerned to relate the so-called Expressionist and Formalist theories of artistic creation to more open-minded 
attempts at religious understanding of the arts and Beauty itself. It becomes clearer 
how attacks on Expressionism sometimes have to beg metaphysical questions. In the 
final third the idea of the expressive is explored for some light it throws on religion and 
aesthetics. 
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At the end of his influential work on artistic experience, The Concept of 
Expression, Alan Tormey speaks of 
The prevalent assumption that a reference to expression in art is either (a) a 
reference to something lying behind or beyond the work — a thought, mood or 
attitude to which the work stands [contingently] in some external relation — or 
(b) a reference to something immediately presented to perception as an aesthetic 
"surface"1. 
Tormey's first alternative is widely associated with Romantic and Later Expressionism 
in writers like Collingwood, Dewey, Langer and Ducasse. The second alternative is 
more frequently connected with the term "Formalism" : it is used in varied v/ays, but 
often in connection with ideas about art in Kant, Roger Fry, Clive Bell and Clement 
Greenberg. 
Hostility between two such Schools in philosophy of art, it may be felt, will tend 
to degenerate into mere ugliness or neat truisms. Yet the contrast between Expressionists' 
stress on feeling and intention and Formalists'focus on special properties can be made 
more liberating. The secular contrast may trustfully be set beside a complementary 
pair of ways in which several kinds of religious believers may cooperate in bringing 
fruitfully together such central concepts as those of God, (or Ultimate Reality), 
Beauty, Creating and Art. I shall approach this religious coupling mainly as a 
proposal in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. But there are brief indications of how 
those with different creedal roots might make use of the double perspective. 
PART ONE 
(A) Some Dichotomies in Religion and Aesthetics 
Many a theist depends for his conceptions of God both on the relatively temporal 
descriptions offered by the Bible, and on the relatively timeless accounts of the 
Supreme Being which appear in much of his theology and accounts of mystical 
experience. Drawing comprehensively on the historical narrative of the same Old 
Testament, a Christian, Jew or Muslim may feel similarly contrasting sources of 
inspiration. Brahman, the Ultimate Reality of Hindus, is timeless and impersonal, yet 
"created" and "reincarnated"; temporally wandering spirits may eventually fuse with 
It through self-perfection. A person may arrive at a point of being finally freed from 
change and suffering. But the immutable Brahman is said to be ever identical with the 
innermost "soul" or Atman of all the continuing finite minds. And some Schools of 
Buddhism could be argued to hold partly similar views of individuals' sufferings in 
time before they reach the timeless emptiness of Nirvana. 
After dwelling on such temporal and timeless forms of religious ideas, one may 
next turn to cases of men who, in discussing Beauty in the arts, always or very often, 
prefer to talk temporally of a person or a group : their intentions or creative impulses 
1. Alan TORMEY, The Concept of Expression, a study in philosophical psychology and aesthetics, 
[Princeton], Princeton U.P., 1971, 164 p. 
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led to a later artistic result. What had been felt or designed came (through skills) to be 
implanted in a communal space and to make that space especially attractive or moving 
to others. Second, one focusses upon those who always or very often prefer talk of 
Beauty and the arts to center upon some revered, simple, almost undefinable property. 
In Plato's Republic, for example, the earlier books deal greatly with what to learn 
about proper ("mimetic") representation of the gods from the works of Homer and 
others. Plato appears to welcome the virtuous poet's or musician's beautiful (kalos) 
result of skilfully and piously imitating the highest qualities of the gods or any kinds of 
excellence as they really are. The right kind of temporal, creative activity has a place in 
Ideal state. By the middle of the Republic's Tenth book, however, most human art is 
rejected as an illusion or as a vicious analogue of illusion. Artistic activity produces 
mere imitations of imitations. Abstract entities like Forms are beautiful (kala) because 
they share in something in which Beauty also must share: they are necessarily 
connected in ontological status and dignity as members of the set of awesome Forms. 
But the paradigm of what is truly beautiful is simply Beauty ( To Kalon) itself. Beauty 
belongs very near the apex of the entire hierarchy of Forms, being effable in still higher 
terms like "Being-beyond-Forms", "Goodness Itself etc. But To Kalon is largely to be 
understood just as what is or sustains one of the highest and purest of ultimate 
properties. Beauty as indicated by the primary sense of "kalon" in To Kalon arises 
from no divisibility or process. It is beyond time. 
A neo-Platonist and early Christian like the Pseudo-Dionysius tries to disclose 
God as "the super-essential Essence" and "the super-essential Beautiful". He approaches 
beauty as one of God's highest properties. He even speaks of the God as Beauty2. For 
the still earlier and more Platonic Saint Augustine there is a similar placing of Beauty 
among the supreme excellences or sources of excellence in God : the contemplation 
comes at the end of the soul's ascent. He even calls God in terms of identity "O Thou 
Beauty..."3. For many teachers of early Christianity, Beauty becomes almost what the 
axiomatic thinker would call a primitive notion — like the most basic ideas of Euclid's 
geometry. With St. Thomas Aquinas' aesthetic thinking we find dialectical considerations 
of how like and yet how unlike Beauty and Goodness are ; how close and yet how very 
irreducible the aesthetic appreciation of experience is from the apprehension of 
Beauty4. Matters are not so different in a secular circle near Queen Victoria's death. 
G.E. Moore argues tirelessly, for example, in his artistically influential Principia 
Ethica of 1903 that only goodness itself is simple and analysable, but that Beauty 
comes quite close to being so : hence Beauty must be one of the very few intrinsic goods 
of Ideal Utilitarianism5. Roger Fry's more popular expression of some Moorean 
teachings helps to make Clive Bell's ideal of artistic excellence, Significant Form, 
supremely important. Bell's Art of 1920 shared many modern artists' faith in making 
the essence of Art a special property, or set of properties — with a lofty, abstract 
2. Cf. PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, On the Divine Names, 2, 3, 13, etc. 
3. Cf. ST-AUGUSTINE, De Trinitate,9, 11, 12. 
4. Cf. ST-THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, la, 5, 4 and 1 ; la, 39, 8. 
5. G.E. MOORE, Principia Ethnica, Cambridge, U.P., 1903, pp. 101-105. 
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flavour imparted by their ways of using a word like "Form". It is hardly surprising that 
Moore had gone through phases of devotion to certain Platonist doctrines before he 
wrote Principia Ethica. 
(B) God, Time and Beauty 
In what follows I shall make two assumptions, but readers are free to substitute 
partial analogues. (I) The first assumption is that a being who is finite in the ways in 
which most humans are finite needs to use both temporal and timeless modes of 
describing and addressing the infinite God who is so different from men. Readers may, 
if they so choose, change this to the claim that temporal (or timeless) talk about God is 
literally correct while the other kind of talk about Divine properties is useful, but 
possibly misleading. (Neither Hartshorne nor neo-Thomists need have the last word.) 
(II) The second assumption is that God is literally simple, but usefully described in 
something like metaphor as a complex being with a horde of truly distinct and 
analysably separate properties. These disjoint properties are like Russell's "Logical 
Constructions", such as sets. But, on the one hand, Russell tended to work at the 
logical construction of a single individual from many — as when he derives truths 
about the average plumber from truths about many actual ones. On the other hand, 
the more traditional theologian had better be usually devoted to logically constructing 
truths about many "metaphorical" properties of God from truth about a single Divine 
Nature6. 
Now turn again to God, Time and Beauty. There seems to be at least one very 
natural path for a host of Biblical thinkers to take on matters of Beauty and Art. To 
take this path, we have seen, is to say {not literally) that Beauty is one of the almost 
purely basic properties of God (Ultimate Reality) ; that we seek to construct logically 
truths about His Beauty from revelations about his simple nature. Like Lovingness, 
Moral Completeness, Perfect Knowledge, Perfect Power and (utter) Self-Sufficiency, 
God's Beauty is disclosed in a variety of ways to all agents capable of beginning to 
grasp it. Those ways, things, states and the like, which reveal God's Beauty, include 
many natural objects, many divine revelations and human artifacts, many properties 
and sets, many actual or potential conceptions of minds endowed with more talents 
than ordinary human minds. 
The Biblical interpreter has been found likely to feel the pull of two fundamentally 
opposed perspectives. There is, first, the "pole" of God the Supreme Person, the 
Supreme Intending Agent, Changer and Creator. When God is so constructed 
logically, at least, as a perfect but temporal being, then the truly beautiful aspects of 
God and His creation are the results of His ever intending and ever continuing to 
maximize the presence of certain supremely valuable properties both in Himself and in 
6. I explain and defend this position at lenght in a paper "Simplicity. Analogy and Plain Religious Lives" 
which appears at Faith and Philosophy, 1, 2, 1984, pp. 216-229. If, however, readers prefer, they may 
treat the talk of a simple creator as metaphoric, but sometimes useful, and the talk of a complex divine 
nature as literal and correct. 
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Creation while it endures. There is, second, the more hellenically rooted vision of God 
as an utterly changeless being without purposes or any future-directed thoughts. God 
would just eternally exemplify values through what He is and through the Creation 
whose history He generates in a timeless present. I have changed my mind more than 
once in my life about the need to give priority to one of these modes of thinking as a 
human about God. Both views of God now seem necessary to me, as "partial 
perspectives", for us to do most justice both to the planner or agent of the Bible who 
appears to change in attitudes towards the chosen people and others, and to the 
unchanging aseity of the Divine in much outstanding theology and mysticism. But, as 
I have already suggested, those who disagree with this "double" approach, may use 
both approaches, while treating only one as a source of literal truth. 
With this religious combination of personal, future-minded agency and transper-
sonal, immutable properties we may crudely compare in aesthetics a dividing of the 
roots for Expressionism and Formalism. On the one hand, examples of Beauty found 
in works of art, natural creations, special states of the mind, and the like can be viewed 
as the results of there being a personal creator and personal creatures. Some of these 
personal creatures, human artists, are moved — whether they fully understand or not 
"what makes them tick" — to do two basic things. They are moved to reflect the 
supreme quality, Beauty, of God and at the same time to disclose inspiring relations 
between Beauty and many features of being a person. The successful human artist, let 
us say, creates works of "Art-Beauty" which reflect Beauty and disclose many of 
Beauty's relations to what is varied but deep in the personal, human or superhuman. 
(To be an artist, good or bad, a human must satisfy a few out of many — not all-
possible criteria for being attracted to Beauty and to manifesting that attraction by 
changing the world.) In revealing or expressing both Beauty and such relations 
between the beautiful and personal, a human artist or an artistically creative agent 
makes it clearer for himself and others what Ultimate Reality and human fulfilment 
are like. 
On the other hand, such a religious believer may add, partial analogues of 
"Formalism" are also well worth developing if one reflects on Beauty and the arts with 
attention to historically familiar talk of what lies "under the aspect of a timeless 
eternity". A supreme property of God's perfection, that which we call Beauty and 
which human creatures may begin to contemplate and properly admire, just is 
instantiated by and in God's nature. It just is fixedly found in the glory of His creation, 
in the rich webs of dependences which stretch atemporally before His all-knowing 
mind ; in the art works of His creatures, and much more. As for this way of considering 
God and Beauty in terms of the unchanging, let us call it The Fixed Aesthetic View. 
There can be far more continuity between Beauty in Nature and certain "expressive" 
kinds of first-rate achievement in the human arts than many Expressionists who 
simply ignore religions as superstitions would probably like to allow. On the other 
hand, interest in religions can help Expressionists when trying to straighten out the 
usual debates on predicates of art works and artists. 
What aid does talk of these two religious views provide when we turn to 
aesthetician's debates about whether certain words in certain places have univocal, 
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equivocal or analogical uses ? What about "The composer is always sad, and his music 
is always sad, and the result is always sad"! The initial answer should be clear enough 
by now : matters vary a great deal with the occasions of use. "Sad" may be used to 
mean "pathetic/pitiful/worthless", in which case there can be many occasions of 
synonymous uses in the sentence for all three occurrences of "sad". The first "sad" 
could be almost equivocal and the next two synonymous when we talk about a 
depressed composer whose jolly-sounding jigs are technically pathetic and worthless, 
leading to disastrous results at the box office. 
In less curious examples we seem forced to allow for possible equivocity of use 
between the first and second predicates. For we are hesitant about any apriorist 
history and psychology of music, which rules that if MM's composition C almost 
always evokes feeling F or thesis T, in listeners, then the composer must have been 
feeling F or believing T when he wrote C ; and/ or must have been trying to evoke F or 
belief in T when he wrote C ; and/ or could not have written C at the time unless at least 
one of the first two conditions or very similar conditions obtained in his mind. 
Some, like Tormey, attack Expressionism in good part because they find such 
apriorism hard to square either with good sense or with known historical facts about 
composers' situations when they compared particular pieces. (And so on for the other 
arts). There could well be some who oppose Expressionism because it does not provide 
a decision procedure for uses of predicates, or does not produce one that yields 
consistent results. Someone who represents the Creative View of Aesthetics could 
comment on such fears like this. "I am careful to distinguish between the supreme and 
abstract property of God, Beauty, and the 'Art-Beauty' of human artists. The secular 
foes of secular Expressionism do not want to be driven to a forced option between 
calling everything beautiful either a natural phenomenon or a work or performance 
carefully wrought from deep human feeling. Expression on my view allows for 
examples of Beauty that are aspects of God's nature ; created things that may seem to 
be human artifacts, but were made by some other agent, agents or chains of causal 
factors (personal or impersonal) ; results of man-made machines designed to go out of 
human control in numerous ways ; results partly of chance, if God wishes to allow 
chance and randomness in parts of the Creation. Every beautiful, created thing must 
be ultimately traceable back in time to God's knowledge, conceptions and creative 
power. Any property in an art work must be ultimately dependent on God's thinking 
about it as a possible property. Every property in an art work has a suitable word in a 
language understandable by God which is synonymous with other expressions in such 
a language. It permits the descriptions of causal chains from properties that originally 
interested God to the present art work. But there is no need to have a theory in human 
languages for relating all uses of aesthetic and relevant psychological predicates in 
terms of equivocity, univocity and analogy." 
One who holds the Fixed Aesthetic View would add that from his atemporal 
standpoint very much the same comments on Expressionism can be made. Where 
what we call successful works of human art are found in Creation, all their properties 
must be traceable in a Divine language, through some human properties to certain 
properties of God or properties (that leave us baffled) in God's thought. Different 
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systems, almost equally rich theories for explaining relations between human predicates, 
can be constructed in human language. The theories may be excellent, yet always 
inadequate for some cases or always in conflict on some cases. The limits of human 
language and logic for explaining human speech may turn out always to be regrettable 
among humans. But one should not therefore despair of gaining wisdom with 
metaphysical reflection. 
PART TWO 
(I) Alan Tormey's Naturalism : Some Philosophical Construction 
Compare these Creative and Fixed Aesthetic Views to the stand of a Naturalist 
opponent of the so-called Expression-Theory of Art like Alan Tormey in his book The 
Concept of Expression. We read, for example, Tormey describing his opponent in 
words like these : 
Expressive properties are those properties of art works (or natural objects) whose 
names also designated intentional states of persons [...] The only way that we can 
interpret the notion of art-as-expression which is both coherent and artistically 
relevant is to construe statements referring to works of art and containing some 
cognate form of "expression" as references to certain properties of the works 
themselves7. 
Complaining that "from the close of the eighteenth century to the present, 'expression' 
and its cognates have dominated both aesthetic theorizing and critical appraisal of the 
arts"8. Tormey notes with special distaste the contentions (i) that "expression must be 
predicated of both artistic process and product", and (ii) that "a noncontingent, 
specifiable relation" must hold "between the artist's activity and the work of art" ; (iii) 
that something expressed by the artist as he works "is then to be found 'embodied', 
'infused' or 'objectified' in the work itself'9: Hence the artist must be "engaged in 
expressing something"10. Tormey is soon glad to mix description, sarcasm and attack. 
According to the theory, Tormey holds, "the expressive qualities of the art work 
are direct consequence of the expressive act"11. But not just any emotional surge of 
expression will do. As Dewey classically put it : expression requires first, "urge from 
within outwards", then "inner agitation", then the "shaping of materials in the interest 
of embodying excitement", then "the welling up... classified and ordered by taking 
into itself the values of prior experience"12. Dewey, Ducass, Collingwood, Santayana, 
Tolstoy, Véron and others are led by related sorts of Expression Theory to intolerable 
conflicts : the precepts of the theory have to be confused with alleged evidence for the 
7. TORMEY, op. cit., p. 128. 
8. Ibid., p. 97. 
9. Ibid., p. 98. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid. 
12. DEWEY, Art as Experience, New York, Putnam's, 1934, pp. 61-62. 
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theory in order to argue for its plausibility, so that contingent and necessary or 
"organic" relations have to be identified 13 ; a contingent, causal relation of expression 
is rejected for failing to isolate the aesthetic, while the postulated non-contingent 
relation is never classified enough to warrant the rejection l4; falsifiably contingent 
and biographical statements about artists' inner states and intentions are confused 
with necessary, criterial statements about the expressive qualities of works of art15 ; 
the Expression Theorist may now put under pressure to hold that his position is 
analytically true. But then it would be empty because it is indisputable — as no such 
philosopher would wish to start trivializing matters by saying 16. 
When we move from studying the basis of his Naturalist criticisms (brightened 
with brief accounts of Wittgenstein) to taking our familiar theist's double view of God, 
beauty and art works, Tormey's attempts to offer universally impressive criticisms 
turn out to be restricted and parochial at the ontological base. His claims may seem to 
be metaphysically neutral, but they are only plausible in relation to one narrow set of 
Naturalist backgrounds. From the standpoint of a Fixed Aesthetic View and of one 
who knows God more closely "face to face", it necessarily pertains to God's essence to 
be beautiful. A supreme property of God-like Beauty must be richly disclosed 
throughout His inanimate creation and through His gifted creatures' productions. 
What is essentially necessary or is analytic truth as reflective of Ultimate Reality {per 
se notum per se) must, of course, be disclosed in God's nature and dependent beings. 
But the essentially necessary or analytic in itself, as Aquinas observed against Anselm, 
is not to be simply equated with what looks conceptually necessary to limited human 
thought {per se notum quoad nos)17. 
From the Creative Aesthetic View, the majority of effects intended by ourselves 
as finite persons and agents must be or must seem to be realized in that otherwise our 
very concept of intention may become too obscure and collapse. There is a non-
contingent link. But intentions often fall short of their ends. And it is possible for 
failure obviously to overtake a good number of our intentions to create beautiful 
things or to disclose effectively some relations between the personal, the felt and the 
beautiful18. Thus there are grounds from the standpoint of Time for considering 
numerous relations between numerous intentions and arrivals at the intended effects 
to be contingent (less than necessarily binding). Accordingly a horde of intented 
disclosures or relations between (i) the beautiful, the felt and the personal and (ii) what 
would be relevant fulfilments of the intention remains in fair part a matter of 
uncertainty. There is no conflict between asserting what the artist meant to do and 
speaking of his failure to do it. Therefore, holders of the Creative Aesthetic View, since 
they distinguish hope for X from attainment of X in some (semantically fragmenting) 
13. TORMEY, op. cit., pp. 100-101. 
14. Ibid., pp. 102-103. 
15. Ibid., pp. 102-106. 
16. Ibid., pp. 105-106. 
17. Cf. F.C. COPLESTON, s.j. History of Philosophy, vol. 2, p. 56. 
18. In God's case, one of omnipotence, His intentions must be fulfilled unless He can Omnipotently will 
self-frustration at the last moment. 
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discussions of contingency, not in all, would refuse to conflate contingent and 
falsifiable assertions of evidence about a creator's state of mind with essentially 
necessary [tautological ?] statements about what the art work's "expressive properties" 
have to be, if they really are works of a certain kind. The theist's metaphysical tenets 
concerning Creative and Fixed Aesthetics do not treat the connection as something to 
be utterly fixed by human lexicons alone nor as something totally mysterious and 
unexplained. Sometimes "X really means Y" means "Y ought to be used like X"19. If 
we could know how and when certain strings of human words ought to be used (to 
reflect Ultimate Reality) we would know why something must be set in this way or 
that. At least, in a Divinely intelligible language the rough equivalents of our Word 1 
and Word 2, used for certain purposes in certain places, would stand in particular 
relations of meaning very clearly. 
But more must be stressed about those intriguing words "Contingency" and 
"Connections" with their large and porous Families of Meanings. For there are 
religious believers who stress Free Will in art. It may well have so happened that an 
artist chose at the last possible moment, after dwelling for weeks on thoughts of green 
and revulsion, to paint this particular work, "Angry Redneck's Angry BoiV\ He may 
well have done so in red from a wholly understood urge to reveal something novel 
about anger and the absurdity of personhood. He may have just suddenly chosen red 
for disclosure. Perhaps he simply chose in puncto temporis to portray anger and 
personhood and Beauty caught up in a beautiful relationship. Perhaps he later 
happened in puncto temporis to choose brown and to catch almost the same 
relationship even more impressively in a similar painting "Angry Brownshirt's Angry 
Boil". Quite possibly, there is for human purposes a radically contingent (uncertain) 
tie in the first painting between how much was revealed about active anger and how 
much was revealed from active anger. Perhaps there is for humans a radically 
contingent (surd) tie between his choice of anger and personhood and his choice of 
red. Perhaps there are for humans radically contingent (theory-defying) ties between 
his choice of relationship to "express" and his choices of colour, size, time for 
execution, eventually preferred audience and much else. And performance can have as 
many kinds of contingency as writing, painting, composing, tattooing and the rest. 
"For", says this religionist in his temporal vein, "this artist is not only a changing 
changer, an agent in time. He may well be a curiously, but truly free contemplator 
whose choices of 'medium' and 'message' are almost as unpredictable to himself as to 
anyone else". Let "disconnectedness", like "contingency", pertain to such matters as 
predictability, defiance of theories, suddenness of becoming, uncertainty, etc. A high 
level of disconnectedness in creative liberty is conceptually quite compatible with high 
degrees of artistically beautiful organization. Therefore, the Creatively Aesthetic View 
allows for the existence of many masterpieces whose makers have, as they work, a 
number of the feelings, emotions and intentions which their audiences acquire in 
seeing, hearing or reading what those makers produce. 
19. Compare : "This is what 'freedom' really means/implies/excludes." 
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It allows for the existence of many brutely contingent or "disconnected"-seeming 
masterpieces. And it insists that there always be in at least one person's mind, even if in 
God's mind alone, a preconception of the feelings, intention and emotions that any 
work of art may disclose, and may reveal in relation to Beauty and to many features of 
a possible person. Such a religionist rejects the thesis that no mind need have a 
preconception of what is expressed in artistic achievements. Tormey's attack on all 
Expressionism reads like a modern atheist's form of Naturalism, not to all possible 
philosophies and forms of wisdom. 
Our believer also dwells on a commitment to expression as disclosure (primarily 
of certain kinds of relations) in his philosophy of art20. Finally, he emphasized the 
richness of contingent and non-contingent kinds of relationship between artists' and 
Nature's contributions to revealing Beauty. Tormey's Naturalism appears somehow 
to veil this richness and the accompanying differences. 
What of a believer who also speaks from a Fixed Aesthetic View? He: could 
explain : "In a comprehensive form of theology for human beings, Expressionism and 
Formalism are far closer to being complementary, not hopelessly opposed, than 
Tormey's Naturalism can let us realize. Beauty should be complementarily seen as a 
major, unchanging property of an immutable God : it is, also, a timeless property of 
elements, qualities and relations found in the four-dimensional manifold of Creation 
as known by its Maker21. The Beauty of natural phenomena in Creation and of 
created people's art and performances turns on what is linked by what in timeless 
chains of dependence. The focus here is on tenseless statements about the property of 
Beauty, its cosmic distribution in forms of dependence or independence. Beauty is 
considered as a precious and all but unanalyzable property. The temporal focus of 
Creative Aesthetics is centred far more on the truth or falsity of tensed statements 
about certain relations between Beauty, persons and products. Such a combination of 
tensed and tenseless truth, rather than Tormey's self-restriction and rival dichotomists' 
gesturings at forced options, teaches us far more about Art and Nature". 
PART THREE 
Roger Shiner's Naturalism : "The Mental Life of a Work of Art" 
Shiner's strikingly entitled essay first appeared in The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism22. While Tormey's philosophy of art is more obviously usable as a 
weapon against secular Expressionists and religionists with a Creative View of 
Aesthetics, Shiner's Naturalism is also just as quickly seen as something for scourging 
secular Formalism and the Fixed Aesthetic View of those who worship. Shiner has 
20. To know what one wishes to do — in some senses of the phrase — need not be to know the correct 
analysis of what one intends to achieve in toto. 
21. Compare BOETHIUS' On the Consolation of Philosophy, Book V. This manifold lies spread out 
atemporally before the omniscient Divine Mind. 
22. XLI, 3(1982), pp. 253-268. 
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much of interest to offer concerning Univocity, but a fair amount of this ground has 
been touched upon already. I wish to concentrate on a few central points about what is 
a more recent and more Wittgensteinian discussion that Tormey's. 
According to Shiner, the insights of Wittgenstein have now made all too obvious 
the sheer unintelligibility of all "thinking" like the dualism of many theists in their 
approach to Beauty, art and expression which I described in Section One. Moreover, 
any form of what Shiner relatedly calls Cartesian dualism must now be denied 
acceptance in aestheticians' rational discourse. For after Wittgenstein's reflections on 
criteria and meaning, we simply cannot talk philosophically of ontological commitment 
to minds — to distinctively non-physical, spiritual entities. 
Minds, we learn, are taken by Cartesians to bind together their mysteriously 
connected, but distinctively live physical objects (bodies) of flesh and bone. And 
minds are also held to affect in turn distinctively inanimate bits and pieces of the 
world. The latter would include pages, words, keyboards, stains, canvasses, clay or 
marble chunks, puppets, etc. Nor are we allowed to take seriously the idea of souls 
affecting body-soul compounds. Such would be some religious believers' ideas of 
conductors and directors that next affect artistically active body-soul compounds like 
symphony players, mummers, comedians, group weavers and ballerinas. According 
to Wittgenstein, one recalls ; "the inner process stands in need of outer criteria". Thus 
any supposed assertion about minds that are separate from observable bodies and that 
unobservably act upon animate or inanimate bodies, or upon live body-soul compounds, 
is just a supposed assertion lacking in criteria for checking its own truth. Hence it is 
unintelligible. Both Expressionism and Formalism, we are told, depend on shady 
dealings in Dualism and must be cast out. 
Comments on Shiner : Stuart Hampshire and others have remarked that emphatic 
talk of dualism in connection with Descartes' dualism is, when heard against the 
background of the intelligible history of human ideas, often bizarre. Let me add the 
(actually) obvious, if neglected. Long before Descartes, serious religions and philosophies 
produced "split", "interactionist" ontologies, hard to police with outer criteria. For a 
grasp of possible ontological divisions and causal relations between refined matter 
and much more consistently observable gross matter is needed to follow Homer on the 
crucial differences between gods, animals, stones, live men with normal bodies, and 
human souls that become like shadowy bats for eternity in Hades, etc. Ideas in the 
Presocratics and Plato suggest that comprehending several mixed ontologies will 
require one to show understanding of individuals and causal relations between them in 
touching on some member of a set like the Following. Take the set : unobservable and 
observable atomic and molecular objects like natural bodies and chunks, material 
stuff'like, fire, dust, fog, smoke, abstract/ore^ like Eros or War or Mind, unchanging 
abstract entities like ratios, numbers and geometrical figures, values, ideal types, etc. ; 
changing non-material entities like souls which can know such unchanging abstract 
entities and forces, while physical organs cannot, etc. Some forms of Judaism, 
Christianity, Islam and Hinduism appear to introduce deep trichotomies with an 
unchanging Supreme Being (spiritual and personal, or non-personal), and changing 
and changed dependent spiritus, changed and changing matter-or-illusion. 
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How some of these "things" can all be said to be or to interact in a criteriologically 
satisfying way may be harder to tell than the history of repeated sets of human ideas 
will allow. Moderns like Wittgenstein or Shiner want to have it both ways. They want 
to dismiss as nonsense many basic human modes of thinking in history about the 
world, yet they want to pose as the champions of cultures who take all Forms of Life 
seriously. As Feyerabend and others suggest, they want to reject high theorizing about 
language, but to speak with the highest authority of scientific theorizers. 
One might next give Shiner the benefit of a twist to Tormey's attacks on Dewey 
and other Expressionist thinkers. Tormey rightly insists that the tenets of a philosophical 
stance on an issue must not turn out to be identical or polemically identified with the 
evidence or the arguments for the theory. I would add that an attack on Dualism as 
unintelligible must not turn out to be largely based on premises (couched in neo-
Wittgensteinian sermonizing) to the effect that Cartesianism or Mind-Body Dualism 
is unintelligible. Nor must the question be begged that public criteria are only needed 
for mind-body dualism, not for all radical forms of "split" — ontology, involving 
categorical interactions. 
Our Creative and Fixed Aestheticians might offer this final comment : "A mode 
of doing aesthetics which consigns a great part of man's spiritual, intellectual and 
cultural history to the rubbish bin carries too great a risk of destroying truth, wisdom, 
freedom, openness to discovery and much else. The probability of the authoritarian 
exclusivist being in part seriously mistaken is too great in view of human performances 
in so many areas. The 'negative' utility of gambling against civilized thinking and 
being mistaken is too high. The claims of the Principle of Preserving Some Cultural 
Continuity are too great. Let us not try to dissolve the Eternal." 
These samples from Tormey's classic book The Concept of Expression and from 
Shiner's more recent "The Mental Life of a Work of Art" should suffice for the 
purpose of reintroducing and indicating how to uphold this linked pair of religious 
approaches to Beauty, aesthetics and expression. They should suffice also to initiate 
more concern for the multiplicity of standpoints accessible to religious philosophies 
and cultures — also for open-minded, cross-cultural reflection. 
Having spent this much time on the high places of theology and the term 
"expression", I ask the reader's leave to conclude with an approach for flexible 
believers and other open-minded friends of metaphysics to making sense of the 
adjective "expressive". I mean making sense of it more practically and simply in 
relation to religious aspirations. I shall be talking about "expressive" for religious 
purposes, but not very directly about the Expression Theory of Art for religious 
purposes. 
PART FOUR 
"EXPRESSIVE" —I 
"Expressive", Ideology and Practical Analysis 
Consider a spokesman for a group with a common ideology who wants at times to 
talk about the arts with very different members of his pluralist society. A Jesuit ballet 
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critic intends to discuss with a brilliant, but rigid Dialectical Materialist from the 
Bulgarian Embassy the comparative merits of a Montreal company's and a Kiev 
company's recent sets for Swan Lake. An Orthodox rabbi aims to discuss certain 
psalms with a broadly mixed literary club of suburban housewives. One useful way of 
dealing with some aesthetic terms whose Sense and Reference may vary in part from 
one ideological group to another is what I shall call the building block approach. 
Descriptive and Prescriptive Analyses in Relation to a View 
First, consider rapidly a building block account of how "miracle" or "miraculous" 
may be intelligently used either in the Canadian mélange of peoples or in the American 
melting pot. (i) P: To call an event a miracle in a purely Psychological way is to call it 
evocative of amazement, wonder, dread, awe, delight or astonishment, or likely to 
affect a human being in such ways, (ii) N : To call an event a miracle in a Psychological 
and Normative way is to say it can, does and ought to evoke such amazement and 
wonder, (iii) E: To call an event a miracle is to say it is Extraordinarily, Most 
Unusually likely to evoke wonder and deservedly so. (iv) S : To call an event a miracle 
is to say that it is a (special) Sign of some crucial truth, as well as being an event that 
generally evokes and ought to evoke an extraordinary degree of wonder from humans 
and any other potentially rational beings, (iva) IS. : It may be an Indefinite Sign 
simply pointing, as for the young Prince Siddartha, to a need for one to give up much 
that one enjoys and seek truth, (ivb) D.S. : It may be a Definite Sign pointing to the 
Tightness of some particular path or way, secular or religious, (ivc) D. TL.S. : It may be 
a Definite Theological Sign calling the witness to follow the event's associated call 
from the Biblical God or the God of some other theist's life. 
For an ideologue to disambiguate uses of "masterpiece" or "artistic masterpiece", 
allowing for its most popular uses, for overlapping popular and ideological habits, 
and also for his fellow ideologists' special handling of the term, the building block 
method proposed for "miracle" seems to work simply and well. A work of plastic art, 
literature or music can be assigned a power to move a normal, sensitive person 
psychologically. It can then be added that the work deserves to move them in the 
direction of better grasping relations between Beauty and being a person/ or between 
Beauty, being a person and having some Emotion or Intention of or Beauty itself; that 
it can so move them and deserves to move them to an extraordinary degree — and so 
on up to the claim that this work of art is a (special) Sign of what constitutes ultimate 
reality and its demands on humans. 
PART FIVE 
"EXPRESSIVE" —II 
Expressive and Its Building Blocks 
When one comes to the still more controversial term "expressive" one finds a 
number of aestheticians divided between various rival "positions". Recall two out of 
this multitude. First, some call a work of art expressive because the human artist has a 
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strong feeling or emotion which he or she sometimes communicates to his or her 
viewers, listeners or readers by virtue of the way he or she creates an opus aestheticum. 
Second, some call a work of art expressive solely by virtue of certain "formal 
properties" of the art-work itself, whatever the human creator's intentions. But the 
theist may be convinced that the wrong metaphysical slant has anthopocentrized and 
secularized such talk of such a term. 
For the medieval and similarly minded modern theist the "natural world" or 
"Second Book", as opposed to the realm of human composition, is the creation of a 
personal agent, an infinitely creative Artificer. The areas and features of the realm of 
Nature can be just as literally expressive as human works of art. For some Humanists 
and deists of the French Enlightenment, and for some modern Marxists a particularly 
striking mountain scene could constitute a Definite Sign that man's forthcoming 
scientific domination of Nature's beauties will make humans'thoughts, societies and 
creations far more beautiful, as well. On the other hand, even in the case of a human 
person's picture, book, film, music, play, opera, ballet, sculpture and the like, the 
"representational" or "abstract" art work may be expressive to the theist of God's 
calling men and women to fulfilment; expressive to a Buddhist of some Sutra's 
thoughts on the joys awaiting those no longer enslaved by Maya. 
Let us try to get at some of the combinable Psychological features of what is 
"expressive" in Art and in Nature. 
There are theists who want to begin the analysis of "miracle" by suggesting as its 
ever best and uniquely best synonymous term something like "act of Divine intervention 
in the Natural Realm". This excludes the vital overlap between secular and religious 
usage — an overlap which may become an invaluable path from Fact to Faith in 
preaching and meditation. Some want to start by freezing the idea of what is 
expressive in rigid terms of one or another human artist's being an expressor of some 
human emotion or idea as the thing to be expressed, and also of some artistic creation 
(or feature of it) as the thing to be expressed or the expressor. 
Let me start, instead, by placing "expressive" among a number of very rough 
synonyms which serve as truth-preserving substitutions within sentences for some, but 
certainly not all contexts. What is expressive of X, may be indicative of X or X's 
relations to Y and Z ; demonstrative of X or X's relations to Y and Z and A, etc. ; 
depictive of X, explicative of X, representative of X, suggestive of X, descriptive, 
contributive, disclusive, adumbrative, imitative, instructive about, debunkative about ; 
intuitively revealing; constructive, reminiscent, revelatory, etc. 
Speaking, then, of the building-block for the ground-level in a secular-to-
ideological analysis of "expressive", let me say that what is expressive of X from a 
Psychological starting part is something of this sort. It is something which can and 
often does cause a duly informed and sensitive person to know, or understand, or 
realize, or become more aware of what X is like ; what X is related and how ; what how 
it feels to be or have X ; why people or other organisms seek or flee X, or like being X, 
or having X, or lacking X ; whom to expose to X or protect from X ; why X has the 
properties or effects it does have, when and where X is good and when X is bad; how X 
is more precious or defiling them anything else ; how very good or horribly sad and evil 
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the world or the community or the industrial would be with or without X, with more or 
less X — and so on in a similar vein for a large cluster of associated results. 
At the level of the Psychological and the Normative, something is expressive of X 
if it has such psychological powers and effects regarding persons' capacity for insight, 
knowledge of relations, understanding, awareness, etc. It is expressive, also, only if 
that something clearly ought to have such powers and effects because of what is shown 
about the beautiful, the beautiful and the personal, and so on. Speaking at the level of 
the Extraordinary, combined with the building-blocks of the Psychological and the 
Normative, one says that something expressive is quite unusually or extraordinarily 
worthy to evoke or increase knowledge, awareness and understanding of certain 
precious "things" implicit in, or related to or other than the object itself. As for the 
roles of "expressive" to indicate a Sign, something expressive may point indefinitely 
for the witness to the need for some fundamental change in his vision and values, or 
definitely to the inspiring and partly imitable example of someone's life. For the 
Biblical theist a work of art may definitely and theologically express some message 
from God to this potentially rational creature — a message through the artist as his 
vessel or messenger. For many a primitive animist a tree's exquisite leaves or a 
cousin's exquisite carving may express in connection with Beauty a warning or a 
blessing from the ruling spirits of his tribe. 
PART SIX 
"Expressive ", Some Possible Examples 
I owe it to the reader to put, at least briefly, some kind of aesthetic flesh on these 
conceptual bones. To do this, let me select an ideological group. In Scotland and 
England, let me say, there are Presbyterians and Anglicans who feel a special warmth 
for each other, as well as a special reverence for authors on both sides in the conflict of 
Cavaliers and Roundheads. There is a shared sense of awe, let me add, for the 
influence of Calvin on architecture, glass, music, clothing and, especially, literature. 
What if one asked a dourly representative member of such a quasi-Calvinist 
group (or a neo-Jansenist group) for an example of some Seventeenth Century 
creation that was expressive and a masterpiece, but purely at the psychological level1} 
One might easily get the example of Merrick's sensual, almost Catullan and frankly 
pagan "Corinna's Going A-Maying". Compare these lines to Catullus' "Nox est 
perpétua una dormienda". 
So when you and I are made 
A fable, song or fleeting shade, 
All love, all liking, all delight 
Lies drowned with us in endless night23. 
23. 65-68. 
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For a severe, but cultivated and sensitive Calvinist such lines could be acknowledged 
as having immense psychological charm, or as being part of a pagan masterpiece — 
but showing no merit to receive wide attention. Again, he would find the lines 
movingly expressive of a pagan's concept of death. Yet no further building blocks 
would be needed. 
Two lines from W.B. Yeats'"The Second Coming" next appear to such a modern 
Calvinist's mind. The author is not even a theist, let alone Christian, but a good 
number of severely Calvinist readers of today might agree that here these lines 3 and 
4 constitute a miraculously expressive point, a masterpiece when taken on their own 
— something which (normatively speaking) ought to move and inspire the reader 
because of the poet's power to ling God, Beauty and persons, as well as to evoke 
contemporary and prophetic insight. Perhaps the poet acts as a prophet malgré lui : 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold,/More anarchy is loosed upon the 
world. 
Tastes and evaluations will vary among my chosen ideologists, but I suspect that even 
Milton and Bunyan would acknowledge the extraordinary power of lines 25-30 in 
T.S. Eliot's Waste Land to move people's hearts, to express the horror of a godless 
world-view, to convey what ought to be conveyed : 
... Only/ There is shadow under this red rock/(Come in under the shadow of this 
red rock),/ And I will show you something different from either/ Your shadow at 
morning striding behind you/Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you;/1 
will show you fear in a handful of dust. 
The last three quotations reveal how some such Christians who nurture suspicions 
against non-Christian or too hiddenly Christian works of art might rise from the 
Psychological to the Normative, to the Extraordinary levels of appraisal. What then 
of the Sïg?î-levels ? We mean, as before, the levels of Indefinite Signs, Definite Signs 
and Theologically Definite Signs. 
Indefinite Signs. Wordsworth's haunting, but tempting notes of what is alleged to 
be pantheism in Tintern Abbey lead him to forge many lines which a Christian might 
find deservedly and extraordinarily moving. Verses 88 to 91 are expressive of a deep 
love for nature. They seem to offer to contented believers an Indefinite Sign which 
calls upon them to make some unspecified but fundamental changes in their lives : 
For 1 have learned/To look on nature, not as in the hour/Of thoughtless youth ; 
but hearing often times/The still sad music of humanity. 
Definite Signs. George Herbert likens the rebirth of nature to his own release from 
spiritual barrenness in "The Flaw", notably at lines 36-42 : 
And now in age I bud again/ After so many deaths 1 live and write ;/1 once more 
smell the dew and rain/ And relish versing : be my only light,/ It cannot be/ That I 
am he/But when thy tempests fell all night. 
Compare the last stanza of Charles Baudelaire's L'albatros with its high musical 
excellence employed to express a tragically definite sign about a good poet's role in 
this life : 
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Le poète est semblable au prince des nuées,/Qui hante la tempête et se rit de 
l'archer,/Exilé au sol, au milieu des huées,/Ses ailes de géant l'empêchent de 
marcher. 
Baudelaire, a profoundly Catholic poet for all the devilish masks of his Les Fleurs du 
Mal, builds L'albatros up to creating a definite, indignant sign of poets'oppression by 
those who do not understand either art or religion. 
For a Definite Theological Sign that endows an expressive masterpiece, consider 
William Blake's introduction to Songs of Experience : 
Hear the voice of the Bard !/Who Present, Past and Future, sees;/Whose ears 
have heard/The Holy Word/That walked among the ancient trees/Calling the 
lapsed Soul,/And weeping in the evening dew ;/That might control/The Starry 
pole/And fallen, fallen light renew. 
Let me close this part of my essay with a stanza from the Bible that I take to be about 
the most Definitely Theological Sign one could get. For here Amos speaks what he 
takes to be God's own message : 
I hate, I despise your feasts,/and I take no delight in your solemn assemblies./ 
Even though you offer me your burnt offerings and cereal offerings,/1 will not 
accept them,/ and the peace offerings of your fatted beasts/1 will not look upon./ 
Take away from me the noise of your songs ;/to the melody of your harps I will 
not listen./But let justice roll down like waters,/and righteousness like an/ever-
flowing stream24. 
PART SEVEN 
Concluding Remarks 
In Part One I presented a Christian's double view of how believers may think of 
God's and man's relations to Beauty, the Arts and some ways of talking about 
Expression. The prescriptive account of how, perhaps, believers ought to talk about 
such matters left some credit in the account of both Expressionist and Formalist 
traditions in aesthetics. The idea of disclosing many forms of beauty itself in a timeless 
present (or "sub specie aeternitatis") was contrasted with the temporal role of agents 
who reveal relations between the beautiful, the personal and persons' emotions or 
intentions. If I am right in concluding that Biblical writings encourage us more to 
think of God as a temporal being, while several great theologians and mystics seem 
more to suggest an eternity without any change, then the two views recommended for 
combining in meditations complement one another well both in keeping with the 
history of aesthetics in recent centuries and in keeping with two basic approaches to 
God in the Biblical tradition. 
In Part Two I dwelt upon these Christian paradigms' relevance to answering 
questions about Beauty and Art more wisely by setting them, where possible, in the 
framework of differing religions, philosophies, ideologies and cultures which appeal 
24. 5,21-24. 
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to what is best in the human spirit. I next went on to try giving some exegesis and, also, 
chastisement to those like Tormey and Shiner who wish to dismiss proposals about 
Expression, if they do not fit a rather narrow, even arbitrary form of Naturalism like 
their own preferred kinds. I argue that openness to rival systems of culture, religion 
and categories cannot be consistently or rationally ended for the sake of some overly 
parochial paradigm of reasoning. The arguments appear to support the legitimacy of 
prescriptive analysis of Art and Expression offered by Christians and other ontological 
explorers during Part One and in the opening of Part Two. 
Part Three tenders a more modest form of analysis which may enable diverse 
Christians to communicate more easily about the Expressive in Beauty and Art — 
both with one another and with cooperative followers of many ideological paths. The 
form of analysis is more simple and practical than the approach of Part One to 
Expression. But the more speculative treatment of "Expression" and the more down-
to-earth method applied more pluralistically in Part Three will, I hope, complement 
one another for those who find such questions as perplexing as I must admit, alas, that 
I do. 
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